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Chapman University School of Law 
Transcription of the Chapman Dialogue:  
“Chasing Leadership Impunity:  The 
Rapid Evolution of International Criminal 
Law” 
Tuesday, November 13, 2012 
Speaker: 
Ambassador David Scheffer* 
My remarks in part will draw from my book All the Missing Souls: A 
Personal History of the War Crimes Tribunals. My address today is about 
the accelerated pace of international justice over the last 20 years. Every 
day the personal history recorded in All the Missing Souls resonates in 
contemporary international politics and law. Understanding why the 
highest political and military leaders are increasingly at risk of prosecution 
today and why the mission of accountability grows with every passing year 
requires looking back at least to the 1990s when, as I write in my book,  
One of the most ambitious judicial experiments in the history of humankind—a 
global assault on the architects of atrocities—found its purpose as mass killings 
and ethnic cleansing consumed entire regions of the earth. The grand objective 
since 1993 has been to end impunity at the highest levels of government and the 
military not only for genocide, which captures the popular imagination with its 
heritage in the Holocaust, but also for the far less understood offenses of crimes 
against humanity and war crimes. 
 
 * Ambassador Scheffer is the Robert A. Helman Professor of Law and the Director of the Center 
for International Human Rights at Northwestern University School of Law in Chicago. In early 2012, 
Ambassador Scheffer was appointed the U.N. Secretary-General's Special Expert on United Nations 
Assistance to the Khmer Rouge Trials, and was selected by Foreign Policy Magazine as one of the "Top  
Global Thinkers of 2011." He has published extensively on international legal and political issues and 
appears regularly in the national and international media. Ambassador Scheffer is the former United 
States Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, serving in that post from 1997-2001. 
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The building of institutions of international justice has had a lot to do 
with that new reality, namely, that impunity is on the losing side of history 
now.  
Understanding why Moammar Gaddafi and his son Saif al-Islam and 
intelligence chief, al-Sanoussi, were indicted by the International Criminal 
Court last year, why Sudan’s current president, Omar Al-Bashir, was 
indicted for genocide in Darfur, and defies to this day the authority of the 
same court, why Radovan Karadžiü and Ratko Mladic are finally standing 
trial in The Hague before the Yugoslav tribunal, why former Liberian 
President Charles Taylor has been convicted and sentenced before of the 
Special Court for Sierra Leon, why three of the surviving top Khmer Rogue 
leaders of the Pol Pot regime are on trial today in Phnom Penh, and why 
the United Nations and U.S. Government are focusing more of their 
attention on atrocities prevention strategies today, takes us back to the 
1990s when major failures occurred in reacting to atrocities, when the five 
major criminal tribunals were negotiated to lock in leadership 
accountability, and atrocities preventions gained a foothold within the 
federal bureaucracy.  
I had the lead American job in building the international criminal 
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone, the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, and the 
permanent International Criminal Court. All the Missing Souls is the story 
of this transformational moment in history about the creation and rise of 
five war crimes tribunals in the 1990s. 
That task occupied all eight years in the Clinton Administration for 
me, so I want to spend a few moments talking about my own role as it does 
frame a personal part of the history in this book and the modern story of 
international criminal justice. I was the “Ambassador to Hell,” but also the 
“Ambassador to Hell and Back.” In my more optimistic moments, I 
considered myself as a carpenter of war crimes tribunals. These courts 
would be the international community’s frontal assault on impunity and 
often had to begin their work amidst ongoing atrocities. 
I was on the Deputies Committee of the National Security Council, 
which thrust me into every major foreign policy decision in the Clinton 
Administration’s first term, and had the first ever ambassadorship on war 
crimes during President Clinton’s second term. I had the support of 
Madeleine Albright, who was a true leader on accountability for atrocity 
crimes. I had the privilege for eight years to work with the most powerful 
woman in the world, both when she was at the United Nations and then as 
the Secretary of State during those eight years. It was a tremendous 
privilege, and for those women in the room who will rise to such power in 
the future, I congratulate you, and I want to tell the men in the room that it 
is okay. You can work for them. It will be just fine. With Albright’s 
support, I was able to press ahead, often against almost impossible 
resistance—from the Pentagon, from budget conscious and always-
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questioning members of Congress, from foreign allies and foes, from the 
United Nations even, and from the intelligence community. I also describe 
in the book those situations where Albright and I had our disagreements. 
I wanted to wait to write this memoir, which I prefer to describe as a 
personal history, because I quite purposefully wanted to describe the rapid 
evolution of international justice during the 1990s through my own lens 
because I was there, and I also wanted to reflect upon it for a good number 
of years before I wrote it. 
I realized from the very beginning of my tribunal-building years in 
1993 that there are many ways to approach the issue of evil. And there are 
now many books that brilliantly examine the sources of evil, not only for 
the Holocaust, but for the atrocities of our own time. How do men, and 
sometimes women, of power so readily and efficiently embrace evil and 
decimate vast numbers of human beings and inspire hundreds and 
thousands to join them in doing so? My book is not designated to answer 
that mega-question in part because many others have focused on that issue 
and because I think the answers are so complex and varied from one 
atrocity situation to another that singular formulas are folly. There is one 
exception: The former prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Luis 
Moreno-Ocampo, often observes that leaders who commit atrocity crimes 
keep doing so to maintain their power. I firmly believe that this is a driving 
force behind evil of our time, just as it has been throughout recorded 
history.  
The challenge that I faced, as did many others, in Washington and 
overseas, was how to discover the right formula in ever-changing 
circumstances to confront monstrous evil in the courtroom. Consider the 
realities of the early 1990s: Mass atrocities, leadership perpetrators, usually 
an ongoing and vicious armed conflict or at least a potentially resurgent 
one, a destroyed or failed court system, unwilling political leaders and a 
skeptical international community, much more focused on the peace or war 
equation of the conflict itself. That was the scenario facing us in so many 
atrocity zones, including the Balkans, Rwanda, and Sierra Leone in the 
1990s. Cambodia was different only in that the atrocities had long ended in 
the 1970s, but the infrastructure was lacking and political landmines were 
all over the place. We were not starting from scratch because of the legacy 
of the Nuremberg and Tokyo military tribunals decades earlier, but ours 
was a very different challenge under far more complex circumstances. This 
would not be victors’ justice, although some have viewed it as the powerful 
imposing justice upon the weak. Modern international justice is no simple 
code of criminal procedure either. The quest for justice meanders back and 
forth between international and domestic courts and between common law 
and civil law principles. Yet, the search for evil aimed for the civility of the 
courtroom and gained from the growing resolve that removing war 
criminals from politics and military leadership would make a difference.  
Do Not Delete 4/9/2013 10:12 PM 
398 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 16:2 
We have witnessed a transformational era in confronting what I call 
“atrocity crimes”—genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and 
pretty soon, there will be an operational crime of aggression in the 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. The last twenty years have 
been nothing but revolutionary in how the world responds to atrocity 
crimes. I do not mean to say that we have come to learn how to effectively 
confront atrocities or the threat of them, and my book describes our failures 
in Rwanda, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Sierra Leone. But I believe we 
have learned some lessons from those failures. Our actions in Kosovo in 
1999, as described in the book, and in Libya in 2011 provide a new 
understanding of the value of military intervention or other measures under 
the fast-evolving responsibility to protect principle. Syria stands in stark 
contrast today to the momentum of both international justice and the 
responsibility to protect and it is a profoundly disturbing and regressive 
contrast. We also need to recognize, however, that in our lifetimes where so 
many transformational events have radically altered our lives and our 
societies—the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the end of the Cold War, 
cyberspace and a radically modernized social media market, the Arab 
Spring, Amazon, and an unimagined economic collapse in a much-heralded 
deregulated marketplace, there also was a transformation in international 
and national justice for atrocity crimes. What happened? To put it simply, 
we emerged from the old world into a new world. But what was the old 
world, namely that world before 1993? 
In the old world we endured hundreds of international and internal 
armed conflicts after World War II. My colleague, Professor Cherif 
Bassiouni of DePaul University College of Law calculated that close to one 
hundred million people were killed in criminal acts far outside any 
legitimate use of military force during that post-World War II period. But 
only about 820 people were indicted for such crimes since World War II 
and most of those have flown under the radar, hardly known to the 
international community as examples of justice, and certainly with no 
known deterrent value in their face, which is all before national courts.  
There were no international criminal courts, there was only the 
memory of Nuremburg and Tokyo and they were collecting dust, usually 
on law school library shelves. The exception to that that I will never forget 
is the book that I was reading every night during the first two months of the 
Clinton Administration. It was Telford Taylor’s The Anatomy of the 
Nuremburg Trials, which had just been published in 1992. It reminded me 
that Nuremburg happened, and it happened big time, and with tremendous 
input by the United States of America. And that actually inspired me in 
those very early months when we were building the Yugoslav tribunal.  
In the old world, there was official impunity and only a few senior 
perpetrators had been prosecuted in domestic courts. The vast majority 
escaped any legal scrutiny: Pol Pot, Josef Stalin, Idi Amin, Papa Doc 
Duvalier, Hafez al-Assad, Nicolae Ceaucescu in Romania, Hale Mariam 
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Mengistu of Ethiopia, Sukarno and Suharto for the atrocities in Indonesia, 
only a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to account for the apartheid in 
South Africa, and only a handful of Argentinean officials domestically 
prosecuted for the “Dirty War.” The entire era of the Soviet Empire, which 
had just collapsed a few years earlier, remained essentially unaccounted for 
in any courts of law, and that remains the case today. The Communist 
world had scorned any true commitment to the rule of law and the free 
world exercised it with very great discretion.  
We have poorly understood atrocity crimes. What did we really know 
about the crime of genocide, about crimes against humanity, and about war 
crimes? Yes, we have the records of the Nuremburg and Tokyo tribunals, 
but we have very little else. Crimes against humanity remained uncodified 
and dangerously vague. Genocide was tied to the Holocaust and the 
Genocide Convention of 1948, which had never been enforced. War crimes 
were tied to the Geneva Conventions in 1949, and yet, were rarely the 
object of court martials, and never, since Nuremburg and Tokyo, 
prosecuted internationally.  
There also was weak national enforcement. Few states incorporated 
atrocity crimes into their domestic criminal codes, including the United 
States. And we had no experience in international jurists. There was no 
body of jurists to draw upon who understood how to integrate international 
criminal law, international humanitarian law, international human rights 
law, and the law of war into a valuable prosecutorial instrument in a war 
crimes tribunal. The experience just simply did not exist in the legal 
academy or the legal profession.  
So then we have the new world, 1993 onwards. And things started to 
change in the 1990s and definitely have changed fundamentally by 2012. 
First, obviously the Soviet Empire is gone as is its anti-legal ideology. The 
rule of law has more of a fighting chance with new alliances of liberated 
nations seeking legitimacy through allegiance to international law, although 
performance often lags behind that allegiance.  
There are now the international courts: the International Criminal 
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the Special Court for 
Sierra Leon, the Extraordinary Chambers in Courts of Cambodia, and the 
International Criminal Court. These are the five tribunals that frame so 
much of the narrative in the last twenty years. There also are special courts 
in East Timor, Sarajevo, Kosovo, and Bangladesh, with others being 
debated for Sri Lanka and Senegal today. The book that I have written is 
about the five major ones that were conceived in the 1990s and built. What 
I had to leave out of the book were my exhaustive efforts to build tribunals 
or jumpstart national prosecutions of the atrocity crimes that enveloped 
south Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Burundi, Iraq under 
Saddam Hussein in the 1980s and 1990s, and Chechnya. All of those were 
on deck in the 1990s and consumed an enormous amount of my time as 
Ambassador, and yet, I ultimately failed to build tribunals for any one of 
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those mass atrocities. Nor did I write about East Timor in the book due to 
space and the fact that the Indonesian government refused to issue a visa 
for me to travel there because, as I understood it, they simply did not like 
my title, Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues. I did sometimes 
wonder if I should just change my title—so attractive to many of our allies, 
the NGOs, journalists and many members on Capitol Hill—to Ambassador 
at Large for Peace and Humankind, and just grab the damn visas and run 
with them.  
But we now have the beginning of the end of impunity. Leaders have 
been indicted and some prosecuted—Slobodan Milosevic, Jean Kambanda 
(the Prime Minister of Rwanda during the genocide), Charles Taylor of 
Liberia, the top surviving Khmer Rouge leaders, Radovan Karadžiü, Ratko 
Mladic, Moammar Gadhafi, Omar al-Bashir—so it is becoming more 
normal than abnormal to achieve accountability, at least through a level of 
indictment, if not ultimately a prosecution. President Omar al-Bashir of 
Sudan has been under indictment for several years by the International 
Criminal Court for genocide and other atrocity crimes in Darfur, and yet, 
he remains the leader of his country and has long been wreaking havoc in 
south Sudan. I think one way of looking at that is the failure for the 
international community to secure the arrest of President al-Bashir has left 
him free to wreak havoc on south Sudan, and he is doing it. As long as he 
remains outside of the reach of this court, because we cannot get to him, 
that situation continues. Yet, there has been a firm effort by many in the 
international communities to stand firm on the al-Bashir indictment despite 
the wishes of the African Union. The Security Council has not agreed to 
suspend the indictment on him, which they have the power to do under 
Article 16 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. The 
Security Council could actually instruct: “Put the indictment aside for a 
year at least; al-Bashir please come to the table and let’s talk; you are free 
to travel anywhere in the world without the threat of arrest; so will you now 
be a good guy?” There are enough members of the Security Council that do 
not trust him and have refused to use Article 16 authority, and I do not 
think they ever will for al-Bashir.  
So far, from 1993 through July 1, 2012, the individuals, mostly 
leaders, charged with atrocity crimes before the tribunals already number in 
the hundreds: there have been 301 indictees; 253 surrendered or captured; 
20 indicted fugitives still on the run; 156 defendants tried and convicted, 
while 23 have been acquitted; 24 defendants are in trial as 8 others await 
the judge’s opening gavel. A total of forty-eight indictees either had 
indictments withdrawn or they died while in custody prior to judgment. 
Thirteen cases were transferred by the Yugoslav tribunal to Sarajevo and 
the war crimes chamber there and were domestically prosecuted, while the 
Rwanda tribunal has transferred four cases to Kigali for trial there. Not a 
single indictee of the Yugoslav tribunal, the Special Court for Sierra Leon, 
or the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia remains at large, 
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and nine indicted fugitives remain, as of July 1, at large for the Rwanda 
tribunal. Ten indictees remain at large with respect to the International 
Criminal Court at present. 
Another big development in this rapid evolution of international 
justice has been our understanding of atrocity crimes. What are these 
crimes? What have the tribunals been doing to adjudicate these crimes, to 
elaborate upon them, to interpret them, to give them broader and more 
substantial meaning beyond the bare words of the statute? Just as our 
federal and state courts do with our statutes and our Constitution, what do 
these words actually mean? While the tribunals have been at it now for 
twenty years, I cannot keep up with it all at all times. I have students who 
write summaries for me. It is like, “Give me a memo that briefs me on the 
totality of decisions last month so I can get up to speed,” because it is a 
massive undertaking to keep up with the jurisprudence of all the tribunals 
now. There have been thousands of decisions, namely procedural decisions 
through the course of trials, and there certainly have been hundreds of 
judgments, all of those dealing with either procedural issues or with 
substantive law issues in the trials themselves. 
Some examples: we now have a much better understanding of rape as 
part of genocide; aiding and abetting as part of genocide; gravity 
requirements for the commission of these atrocity crimes; command 
responsibility; specific intent and inferred intent; new or better understood 
crimes against humanity such as forced marriage, apartheid, forced 
pregnancy; persecution and modern forms of ethnic cleansing; and how to 
understand and prosecute the crime of torture. 
We also now have an evolving understanding, although it has not been 
litigated yet, of the crime of aggression because in 2010 the States Parties 
of the International Criminal Court agreed to amend the Rome Statute so as 
to include a definition and an operational basis for the crime of aggression. 
That is not part of the court’s operational capacity yet—we have to wait 
until 2017 and thirty State Party ratifications of that amendment for it 
actually to kick in and not for all States, as it is a very complex formula of 
how the crime of aggression has been inserted into the Rome statute—but 
future work in this area is very much going to focus on the crime of 
aggression. 
It is important to use and understand atrocity crimes as a preventative 
tool as well as an accurate description of what the tribunals are prosecuting. 
It is preventative in order to avoid the paralyzing consequences of awaiting 
genocide to spur policy makers into either action or retreat. 
Arising from atrocity crimes, I have argued that a sophisticated body 
of law also has begun to emerge. I call it “atrocity law,” which is the law 
applied by, and developed further by, the war crimes tribunals. It is an 
intersection of international criminal law, of international humanitarian 
law, of international human rights law, and of the law of war. The common 
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mistake heard daily is to describe the law of the tribunals, or what is being 
violated in the field, as international humanitarian law. That is not 
necessarily the case. International human rights law is too broad as is 
international criminal law, which covers an enormous amount of 
criminality around the world. The law of war is too narrow for these 
tribunals. Any study of the war crimes tribunals and the law they are using 
has to recognize that it is of unique character, and should be described as 
such. 
We do have stronger international enforcement now. Witness what has 
transpired in Bosnia and Herzegovina, namely the War Crimes Chamber in 
Sarajevo, and in Serbia, in Croatia, in Rwanda, and in the tens of countries 
that have upgraded their criminal codes as part of implementing the Rome 
Statute. Even in the United States there is a beginning, with Senator Dick 
Durbin’s Genocide, Child Soldiers and Human Trafficking Accountability 
Acts, which were all enacted by Congress in the late 1980s. In fact, all were 
enacted in the last few years of the George W. Bush Administration. There 
is recently President Obama’s executive order on war criminals of August 
2011 and then in Spring 2012 he created the Atrocities Prevention Board. 
My great hope in the next Congress is that the bill that Senator Durbin 
drafted a few years ago, namely the Crimes against Humanity 
Accountability Act, somehow could be resurrected in the new Congress 
and move forward. The reason I say that is because there are a lot of gaps 
in U.S. law with respect to the atrocity crimes. If one thinks one can enter a 
federal court today and prosecute someone for the crime of persecution, 
namely ethnic cleansing, that essentially is not possible. The international 
crime of persecution is not in the U.S. federal code, it is not in Title 18, it is 
not in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, it is just not there. I think it is 
extremely important that the United States have the capacity within its own 
courts, to get up to speed, to modernize its federal law so that we are 
capable of prosecuting these crimes in our courts. The more we are capable 
of doing so, the more we actually insulate ourselves from the reach of the 
International Criminal Court because under the principle on 
complementarity, the court has to defer to the national system if that 
country has the capacity in its courts to prosecute atrocity crimes and is 
genuinely able and willing to do so. Those nations that have ratified the 
Rome Statute, particularly America’s European allies, Latin American 
allies, and Japan, have revised their criminal codes and they say, “We are 
not really worried about the ICC with respect to our county because we 
have a criminal code that covers all of this and if there is any suspicion on 
the part of the International Criminal Court with respect to one of our 
nationals, you bet we are going to get on top of this in our own courts and 
this thus compel the International Criminal Court to back off.” I strongly 
believe that the United States should have that same capability. 
There are experienced jurists now. I have had twenty years of 
excellent relationships with a large body of lawyers, investigators, and 
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judges from all around the world who have sat in these tribunals, have 
prosecuted, or have been defense counsel. This is grown into a very large 
legal academy now. They should create some association or something so 
we can keep track of them all. And our Justice Department now has scores 
of American lawyers, who as federal lawyers, joined the staffs of the 
tribunals and spent some time prosecuting or acting as defense counsel or 
as investigators. I gave a speech in Chicago a few years ago at the Drake 
Hotel, before a Justice Department annual conference of Justice 
Department lawyers. After I gave my speech I saw this group of lawyers 
approached me and said, “Ambassador Scheffer, hello, do you remember 
us?” Well, I had arranged for employment of so many of them in the 
tribunals back in the 1990s. And I had sort of forgotten faces, but it was an 
astonishing moment. They said, “This is what we are doing now in the 
Justice Department; we are actually dealing with human rights; we are 
dealing with war crimes in the Justice Department.” And so we have this 
very rich reservoir of legal talent now not only in the United States but 
elsewhere that just did not exist twenty years ago.  
Finally, there has been the influence of international politics. During 
the negotiations for the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court 
in the 1990s, there was a lot of concern about the extent to which the 
Security Council would influence the work of this independent court. The 
United States position, as I write about in my book, was that the referrals 
that go to the International Criminal Court should be from the Security 
Council. Other countries wanted them also to be referred by State Parties 
and by an independent prosecutor that investigates and then convinces the 
judges to proceed with a case. The United States’ position was that we 
wanted this court, but we wanted the Security Council referrals to frame the 
jurisdiction of the court. Why? A simple reason is that as a permanent 
member of the Security Council, the United States can exercise 
considerable control of the Security Council.  
So much of the politics in the 1990s was this angst in the international 
community about Security Council control of the court and the United 
States had to keep pushing back on that fear. It is one of the great ironies in 
history that if one reads the debate from October 2012 in the Security 
Council, the President of the Security Council that month was the 
Permanent Representative of Guatemala. Guatemala is the latest State 
Party, the 121st State Party to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court. And as President of the Security Council, the Guatemalan 
Permanent Representative called a special one-day session on the 
relationship between the ICC and the Security Council. Reading through 
those statements, one discerns that there is a tremendous amount of angst 
these days by countries that the Security Council is not doing enough to 
help the court. It is not intervening to refer Syria to the International 
Criminal Court. It is not following through once it has made a referral of 
either Libya or Darfur. It is not following through to ensure the cooperation 
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of the States with the court to ensure that the prosecutor can investigate the 
crimes and follow through on the mandate given to her by the Security 
Council. There is no mandatory cooperation clause in those resolutions 
other than for the target country itself, and many other countries must be 
involved in cooperating with investigations. So, it is fascinating to observe 
this ironic twist that fourteen years later, from 1998 when the Rome Statute 
was finalized, there are countries seeking the help of the Security Council, 
because the Security Council actually has some clout and it actually can 
force governments to do things. 
I want close with two basic arguments that are presented with respect 
to international justice today. One is the unending argument about 
deterrence and whether or not these courts actually achieve the goal of 
deterrence of these crimes. Well, I think the question of whether 
international tribunals must deter the killing is a straw man often used to 
actually denigrate international justice. One observes this in one article 
after another where scholars ask, because the Yugoslav tribunal did not 
actually deter the 1995 Srebrenica massacre, what is the worth of this 
tribunal? 
The primary purpose of the international and hybrid criminal tribunal 
is to render justice and reveal some of the truth about what transpired in the 
commission of atrocity crimes in ravaged societies. That means 
investigating massive crimes and leadership suspects, indicting and 
prosecuting some of them and rendering judgment followed by either 
conviction or acquittal. It is a false burden to place on the shoulders of the 
tribunals to assess their legitimacy and utility by whether they have stopped 
the killing or deterred further on-going atrocity crimes or the 
commencement of future atrocity crimes. Such deterrence is a tremendous 
bonus if it occurs, and we hope for it, but that is not the primary purpose of 
the tribunals. Victims want top perpetrators to suffer punishment and that is 
precisely what criminal courts are designed to achieve. This is particularly 
true where there are tens and hundreds of thousands of victims and those 
responsible for such horrors controlled the levers of power. 
Nonetheless, I argue that international tribunals have a generational 
impact on war-ravaged societies that ultimately impact societal norms and 
behavior. Professor Kathryn Sikkink of the University of Minnesota, in her 
book, The Justice Cascade, which I reviewed for the New Republic 
September 2011, uses comparative empirical research over the last three 
decades to demonstrate how human rights prosecutions at the domestic and 
international level in fact have influenced the decline in human rights 
abuses and atrocity crimes in the relevant nations and even in neighboring 
countries over the long term. I believe we will see similar results in the 
Balkans, several regions of Africa, and Cambodia in decades to come. 
It is also very important to ask whether in the absence of tribunals and 
indictments, tyrants and atrocity lords are coming to the peace table and 
negotiating settlements to stop the killing. Does that empirical evidence 
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stand up to scrutiny any better than many examples in the last two decades 
where leaders under investigation or indictment lost their international 
legitimacy and ultimately their power? Consider the ultimate fates of 
Slobodan Milosevic, Jean Kambanda, Charles Taylor, Radovan Karadžiü, 
Ratko Mladic, Moammar Gadhafi, and even President Omar al-Bashir of 
Sudan. Al-Bashir remains in power, but with far less legitimacy and 
influence internationally and a very limited flight pattern. President Bashar 
al-Assad of Syria has not relented anything in the absence of an indictment. 
Indeed, he seems to grow more defiant by the day. But I would argue that if 
the International Criminal Court obtained jurisdiction over the Syrian 
situation, following a Security Council referral, al-Assad’s departure from 
Damascus would be accelerated and respect for human rights more likely 
for the Syrian people. International justice does not guarantee political 
defeat, and neither does the use of military force for that matter, but it has 
built an impressive record since 1993. 
In the final analysis we need both tools—international justice and 
military force—to confront most effectively the challenges of atrocity 
crimes. How we use each tool and under what circumstances is the 
challenge of wise policy-making that is far removed from a knee-jerk resort 
to go-it-alone U.S. firepower that some continue to advocate.  
 
